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Abstract 
In response to a series of adverse weather events, in parts of the cereal crop belt from 
1998 to 2001, the State and the Commonwealth Governments implemented support 
measures for farmers in the cereal belt of Western Australia.  
 
A critique of the State Government Adverse Seasonal Conditions in the Agricultural 
Sector (ASCAS) support packages is presented. 
 
The schemes are expensive, could adversely affect the normal adjustment process, have 
subjective boundaries, deliver grants to some multi millionaires, attract a small element 
of clearly ineligible claimants, and in 2001 the second ASCAS package was provided 
prior to excellent late winter and spring rains. 
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Background  
A series of adverse climatic events impacting on broadacre farms in WA led the State 
Government to introduce a grant scheme in late 2000. 
 
A serious drought during the 2000 season in the cereal crop belt followed a flood in some 
of the northern agricultural areas in 1999 and severe frost events in the south-east 
agricultural area in 1998 and 1999. There were also floods in January 2000 adversely 
affecting the harvest from the 1999 crop in the south-east agricultural areas. These events 
triggered the Adverse Seasonal Conditions in the Agricultural Sector (ASCAS) State 
Assistance Package. 
 
Farmers who could demonstrate in two of the three years (1998 to 2000) that their farm 
business expenditure was greater than 85% of their farm income due to adverse weather 
conditions, would be eligible to receive up to $5,800 in assistance. Due to the limited size 
of the grant, eligibility criteria relating to viability and equity were not included. Farmers 
were defined as usually having more than 50% of their income and contributing more 
than 50% of their labour to the farm. 
 
The ASCAS grant could be used for any one or a combination of the assistance measures. 
The aim of the package was to assist farmers to retain livestock while minimising the risk 
of land degradation due to overgrazing. This was to be achieved by restricting the stock 
to a relatively small area of land able to withstand heavy stocking rates or removing the 
animals from the property. Funds were not available to support hand feeding of stock on 
a broad acre basis on light sandy soils prone to water or wind erosion. 
 
Farmers receiving grants were directed to use local materials and labour where possible. 
The Government was keen to have as much of the grant as possible spent locally. It was a 
limited attempt at social engineering. The State Government was cognisant that rural 
businesses were also suffering extensively from the drought. There was no grant 
available directly to rural or urban businesses adversely affected by the drought.  
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The State Assistance Package was extended for one month to 31 August 2001 due to very 
poor opening rains in 2001 and was named the Adverse Seasonal Conditions Assistance 
Scheme (ASCAS II). Details in this paper include payments made from both packages 
and are referred to as ASCAS. In the second package eligibility criteria required farmers 
to have had their farm business expenditure exceeding 85% of combined actual income 
for the two years 2000 and 2001. In 2001 the calculation of operating expenditure over 
income to be greater than 85% had to be an estimate as the application had to be 
submitted by the end of August 2001. Some farmers were ineligible for the first ASCAS 
package but were eligible for the second ASCAS package. 
 
Table 1 
Specific Assistance Measures 
 
Purpose  Explanation  Conditions 
Agistment  Subsidies for agistment and 
transport to agistment or 
transport to sale 
·  90% of cost of transport 
to and from agistment 
·  The agistment 
·  50% of the cost of 
transport to sale for 
stock sold because of 
the drought 
Feedlot infrastructure and 
feed 
Subsidies for feedlot feed 
and for the construction of a 
feedlot  
·  Feedlot site had to be 
approved 
·  Feedlot materials and 
labour 
·  Grain and fodder  
Soil testing  Subsidy for assistance with 
soil testing for fertiliser 
decisions for 2001 
·  Soil tests 
·  Sampling costs 
Dams  Construction and repair  ·  Dam and catchment 
construction in areas 
affected by the 2000 
drought 
·  Dam and catchment 
repair for damage from 
the January 2000 floods 
Pastures  Re-establishment for 
pastures destroyed by the 
January 2000 storms and 
2000 drought 
·  Seed purchased 
·  Seeding costs 
Water  Domestic and stock water 
for farms seriously affected 
by the 2000 drought 
The cost of water and its 
transport 
 
Season 2000 was the smallest harvest, on a statewide basis, since 1987. The decline in the 
2000 harvest compared to the previous five-year average was the largest decline since the   4 
1969 harvest. The years 1995 to 1999 had been exceptionally favourable for crop 
production (see Table 3). State average wheat production was 1.9 tonnes per hectare or 
greater in three of those years and 1.75 tonnes per hectare for the other two years. These 
were years of record yields. The five-year run to 1999 was an unprecedented period of 
exceptionally good crop production. Prices for wheat were also high ensuring farmers, on 
average, had an extremely good five-year period. Most farmers should have been 
equipped to handle the downturn that occurred in 2000. On average the state's wheat 
farmers did very well up to 1999, although there were areas that missed out on the extra 
good years. 
 
The State Government wished to provide assistance to farmers who they felt, through no 
fault of their own, were seriously affected financially by the drought in 2000 and may 
have suffered through frost and unseasonal rainfall events in the couple of years prior to 
2000. Although the ASCAS grant was small it provided an indication that the 
Government was concerned for those farmers. A main concern was for farmers to retain 
the nucleus of their breeding flocks without seriously jeopardising their land resource. 
 
Table 2 
Breakdown of Expenditure within the ASCAS package* 
 







Pasture  $985,605 
Soil Testing  $299,289 
Dam construction and 
cleaning 
$2,090,457 
Water Cartage  $329,300 
ASCAS - TOTAL  $6,180,536 
      *Grants were paid to approximately 2000 farmers 
 
Over fifty per cent of ASCAS applicants came from six shires, parts of which were later 
declared to be in the Exceptional Circumstances area, a Commonwealth/State assistance 
scheme. The other applicants came from another 60 shires throughout the crop sheep belt. 
 
Economic Justification for Assistance 
The provision of services by government is warranted when there is likely to be a 
significant cost to the community if the Government does not act. For example, where 
there is market failure, governments may have a role to make a financial contribution 
provided benefits exceed costs. Often this is the case with some services such as research 
and development or public health where private entrepreneurs may be unable to recoup 
the costs of their service delivery. Sometimes government involvement in the elimination 
of certain weeds, pests and or diseases is also justified where benefits outweigh costs.  
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The provision of assistance to farmers after drought does not qualify under a market 
failure test. Even if the quality of land resource is considered there is no public benefit. 
The only benefit is to the farmer, a private benefit. The encouragement for farmers to 
adopt lot-feeding practices is a normal extension activity and does not warrant financial 
inducement for the practice to be adopted. 
 
If the conditions for farming become unfavourable it would be inappropriate for any 
Government to attempt to keep farmers on the land, farming unprofitably. Australia 
continually berates the US and European Governments for their subsidisation of 
uneconomic farming practices. The market place is the preferred mechanism determining 
whether farming should continue or not. Untrammelled market signals will ensure more 
efficient farmers take on a farm where a previous occupant has failed. 
 
The move to more efficient farming has long been a feature of WA agriculture. In the 
1950s 141 farms were produced from the clearing of 250,000 acres in the Jerramungup 
area (Cameron, 1963). If an economic farming unit today was approximately 4,000 ha 
(10,000 acres), the number of farms in the same area would now be only 25. There would 
have been 116 farming units abolished in the period of about 50 years. Jerramungup's 
recent run of poor seasons only affects the rate of change but does not affect the overall 
tendency to bigger more economic farms.  
 
Larger farms, particularly in the cropping and to a lesser extent in the broadacre livestock 
industries, have generally been able to capture more benefits from new technologies and 
have achieved much higher growth over the past two decades. Higher productivity 
growth for larger farms has been very important in improving the financial performance 
of large farms relative to that of smaller farms. ABARE survey estimates show that at 
practically any scale of operation, the more efficient and profitable farmers tended to be 
expanding farm area, while those who were managing less profitable operations tended to 
be the ones selling land (ABARE, Australian Commodities 2002). 
 
The provision of drought relief can only be supported on welfare grounds. Consequently 
drought relief should be identified as welfare support. There are provisions for welfare 
support under the existing Commonwealth CentreLink programmes. Farmers who need 
to exit farming can be provided with financial support to relocate out of farming. There 
are asset restrictions attached to this support.  
 
Social security system support targeted on family incomes is a more direct and effective 
way of meeting society equity concerns than is drought assistance (Freebairn, 2002). 
 
Arguments against ad hoc drought relief payments 
Drought assistance increases the return to agriculture above market returns. Such 
subsidisation causes over the longer run too much labour, capital and other scarce 
resources to be drawn into agriculture away from other parts of the economy. Australia's 
world class economic growth over recent decades has been achieved in part by removing 
selective industry assistance. Drought assistance would be a retrograde move for a 
productive economy (Freebairn, 2002).   6 
 
1. The eligibility criteria resulted in some farmers just missing out. One farmer may be 
suffering the same as his neighbour but is ineligible because of a line on a map. Other 
parts of the criteria can also throw up anomalies when professional assistance can help 
one farmer access the support and the next farmer applying on his own will not be as 
familiar with the criteria and will not be able to demonstrate that he is eligible.  
 
2. As well as the inadequacies of the eligibility criteria there are farmers who apply for 
funds when they are clearly not eligible. Although attempts to rort the assistance scheme 
were minimal, still administrators had to be vigilant against wrongful provision of grants.  
 
The ASCAS scheme provided finance to farmers with significant assets. Governments 
provided grants to multi-millionaires.  
 
3. Government money has a cost associated with its collection. It has been estimated that 
it costs about 15 cents to collect a dollar (Fullerton, 1991). As well as the cost of the 
collection of consolidated revenue there is the cost associated with the conduct of the 
scheme. This could be in the order of 25%. For every grant of $5,000 the cost to the State 
is about $7,000. The $6 million expended on grants to farmers in the State ASCAS 
packages has a real cost to the community of $8.4 million. 
 
4. The effect of the ASCAS packages on the ability of farmers to remain in farming was 
only marginal. The State/Commonwealth EC scheme would have had a more significant 
effect. The EC scheme provided, up to $100,000 per annum for two years, interest relief. 
However any assistance scheme hinders the ability of more profitable farmers from 
taking up farms that run at low profit. This in turn adversely affects the profitability of 
the farm sector. The Department of Agriculture's objective of increasing the State's gross 
value of agricultural production is adversely affected. 
 
The slowing down of exiting decisions by farmers could also be detrimental to the 
farmers concerned. It may give them false hope and hinder their successful transition out 
of farming in the future.  
 
5. Weather conditions can change dramatically after a decision for support is made. The 
second ASCAS package ran for one month in August 2001. The opening rains for that 
year were as bad as ever experienced. However after the late rains in July, follow-up 
rains in August and spring enabled the state to record a very reasonable year. The state 
average for wheat in 2001 was 1.66 tonnes per hectare. When ASCAS II was 
implemented the outlook was more like a crop of less than 1 tonne per hectare. The high 
price for wheat produced the second highest year for farmers in terms of revenue received 
from wheat in 2001. (See Table 3 below.)  
 
The 2001 rainfall events subsequent to the decision to extend the package rendered the 
July decision to be premature. Estimates of returns made in August were substantially 
lower than actuals. The State Government extended the ASCAS package before the 2001 
harvest had been determined.   7 
Table 3 
Western Australia State Average Wheat Yield and Revenue, 1990 to 2002. 
 
Crop Year  State Average 
Wheat Yield (t/ha) 
Wheat Price 
($/tonne ASW) 
Average Total Revenue 
($/ha) 
1990  1.50  127  190 
1991  1.46  184  269 
1992  1.63  193  314 
1993  1.74  162  282 
1994  1.50  200  300 
1995  1.75  249  436 
1996  1.75  193  338 
1997  1.90  193  367 
1998  1.93  185  356 
1999  1.98  190  376 
2000  1.31  225  295 
2001  1.66  243  403 
2002  1.0 (est.)  274  274 
From M O'Connell, 2001 
Conclusion 
A $6 million State Government drought support package cost the State approximately 
$8.4 million. Yet economic grounds for the drought support package were negligible. 
Support for drought stricken farmers should be seen as welfare. 
 
The recent ASCAS packages suffered from having lines on maps arbitrarily eliminating 
some applicants. There was inappropriate use of grant money received, as well as grants 
being provided to asset rich farmers.  
 
The effect of the grant would have been marginal in keeping farmers on the land longer 
than would otherwise have been the case. The State/Commonwealth Exceptional 
Circumstances grant would have greater impact.  
 
Finally, provision of funds, for ASCAS II, prior to the finalisation of the season, resulted 
in the second best year in the last decade having a drought package. If the package had 
not been considered until after harvest it is not likely to have been implemented. 
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